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Abstract— We demonstrate that game-theoretic calculations 
serve as a useful tool for assisting cyber wargaming teams in 
identifying useful strategies. We note a significant similarity 
between formulating cyber wargaming strategies and the 
methodology known in military practice as Course of Action 
(COA) generation.  For scenarios in which the attacker must 
penetrate multiple layers in a defense-in-depth security 
configuration, an accounting of attacker and defender costs and 
penetration probabilities provides cost-utility payoff matrices 
and penetration probability matrices. These can be used as 
decision tools by both the defender and attacker.  Inspection of 
the matrices allows players to deduce preferred strategies (or 
COAs) based on game-theoretical equilibrium solutions.  The 
matrices also help in analyzing anticipated effects of potential 
human-based choices of wargame strategies and counter-
strategies.  We describe a mathematical game-theoretic 
formalism and offer detailed analysis of a table-top cyber 
wargame executed at the US Army Research Laboratory.  Our 
analysis shows how game-theoretical calculations can provide an 
effective tool for decision-making during cyber wargames.  
Keywords—wargames, game theory, cyber defense, cyber-
physical systems 
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Cyber wargaming is increasingly often used by 
commercial and public-sector organizations. Such a wargame 
typically involves actual employees of an organization who 
play roles in a human-based (and occasionally computer-
based) simulation of a cyber attack and responses to the 
attack. A number of consulting organizations provide 
wargaming design and facilitation as a service [1]. The 
growing prominence of cyber wargames is hardly surprising. 
Cyber conflicts involve problems of adversarial nature, not 
unlike those in military practice, and these are often solved by 
resorting to game-theoretic models, or by simulations – 
wargames.  
However, theoretical foundations and guidance for cyber 
wargaming are lacking. In this paper, we offer a game-
theoretic model of cyber attack and defense, compare the 
model-based analysis with experiences of an actual table-top 
wargame, and offer recommendations on using game-theoretic 
analysis for enhancing accuracy and value of such cyber 
wargames. 
A. Current Practices of Cyber Wargaming 
In spite of its growing popularity among corporate and 
government organizations [2], the term “cyber wargame” is 
not particularly well defined and may refer to many different 
forms of an exercise, test, simulation or emulation event. 
Typically, unlike penetration testing in which “white hat” 
hackers seek to find the company’s technical vulnerabilities, a 
corporate cyber wargame often places emphasis on a business 
scenario involving a cross-section of the company’s business 
functions [3,4,5].  Modern cyber wargaming in corporate and 
government scenarios [6,7] utilize the insights and experience 
gained from military wargaming [8,9,10]. 
The wargame is structured – often by a specialized 
consulting organization hired for this purpose [1] – to simulate 
experiences of a real cyber attack, and realistic responses to it. 
Participants of the wargame often comprise the company’s 
employees from multiple functional areas: information 
security, application development, network operations, 
facilities management, customer service, production, 
marketing, legal and public affairs, financial, and distribution.. 
These players gather in one or several conference rooms, for a 
duration of anywhere from 4 hours to 3 days, and under the 
guidance of professional facilitators proceed to enact the 
events of a cyber attack, usually developing a strong 
commitment and passion in the game. 
Great diversity in the types and forms of cyber wargames 
is found in current cyber exercises.  Such diversity can be 
characterized along several dimensions: 
 Breadth of business functions: the focus of a 
wargame may range from strictly technical 
considerations of vulnerabilities, capabilities and 
activities of software and hardware, to a broad 
coverage of business functions, e.g., financial, media, 
legal and business operations aspects, where the 
technical cyber compromise is merely a starting point 
of the scenario. This may correlate with the seniority 
of decision-makers involved: broader scenarios may 
involve leaders higher on the corporate ladder.  
 Scale of an entity under consideration: a wargame 
may concern itself with an entity limited to a single 
web server to large-scale operations or a multi-
national corporation; it could be a single system or 
network, a site or an enterprise or an international 
system of enterprises.  
 Realism of the game: a wargame may range from a 
tabletop exercise with little more than paper and 
pencil; to computer-assisted simulations; to use of 
emulated cyber ranges; and even to attacks on 
operational systems. 
The process of designing, implementing and executing a 
cyber game normally involves most of the following steps (not 
necessarily sequential or in this order). They could be 
performed by a consulting organization in close collaboration 
with personnel of the company [2]:  
 Defenses: Identify security mechanisms, tools and 
personnel; their attributes and capabilities. 
 Threats: Hypothesize suitable threats, their 
capabilities and likely TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures), goals, limitations, access opportunities, 
skill levels, time and resources available to them. 
 Attacks: Formulate and select attack scenarios, 
including at least two -- most likely to be executed by 
the threat against this organization and most 
dangerous – the one that may be less likely but would 
cause the greatest damage. 
 Players: Recruit relevant participants-defenders from 
the company; who are relevant to the site or 
enterprise being wargamed; and who would 
realistically be engaged in defending against a given 
a threat scenario. 
 Blue cell(s): Organize the participants-defenders into 
a team or teams responsible for planning and 
executing defensive actions; such a team is called a 
Blue cell; preferably, participants are organized into 
teams (cells) that are reflective of the actual 
organizational structure of the company. 
 White cell: Provide a white cell, i.e., trained 
individuals who have experience in wargames and 
can document important information emerging 
during the wargame, guide and facilitate the game, 
and adjudicate or arbitrate outcomes of individual 
actions taken by participants. These are usually 
outside consultants.  
 Red cell: Provide or designate a team of individuals 
who play the role of the attacker; such a team is 
called the Red cell. 
 Rooms and Props: Prepare physical facilities, means 
of communication, paper or computer-based products 
to conduct the game. 
 Play: Assemble all cells, begin execution of the 
scenario, let the Red cell attack, Blue cell defend, and 
White cell declare the status as it evolves and inject 
additional events to keep the game moving in the 
right direction. 
 Payoff: Analyze the observations and results of the 
game, and formulate recommendations.  
The outcomes and benefits of the cyber wargame vary 
depending on the goals of the organization. These may include 
identification of hidden vulnerabilities, incorrect assumptions, 
and need for additional procedures and training.  
A cyber wargame can also help identify poorly understood 
risks; educate and entertain personnel; obtain support of senior 
decision-makers; explore the extent of potential disruption to 
various business functions; clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of cyber responders; improve communication 
among them; allow stakeholders to get to know one another, 
and build relationships; understand decision-making 
authorities; highlight interactions with third-party business 
partners; identify potential gaps in an organization’s 
preparedness and response plans. 
B. Military Practice of Course of Action Analysis 
Much of the techniques used in cyber wargaming appear to 
be influenced or directly borrowed from military wargaming 
practices. The US Navy War College has provided extensive 
expertise and documented guidance for military wargaming 
[9,10]. In the US Army, wargaming practice is often called 
Course of Action (COA) Analysis [11,12]. Although such 
analysis is performed by military units of various sizes -- from 
a small unit called squad to a very large organization called 
corps – here we will use an example of a unit called Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT).  
Somewhat comparable to a mid-size corporation, a US 
Army BCT includes several thousands of professional soldiers 
and officers, hundreds of combat and support vehicles, 
helicopters, sophisticated intelligence and communication 
equipment and specialists, artillery and missiles, engineers, 
medical units, and repair shops. In a battle, these assets might 
perform hundreds of complex tasks of multiple types (similar 
to corporate “business functions”): collecting intelligence; 
movements; direct and indirect fires; constructing roads, 
bridges, and obstacles; transporting and handling supplies; 
managing the civilian population; command and control, and 
so on. Unlike in cyber wargaming, the threat (i.e., the enemy 
that the BCT fights against) tries to apply much physical 
destruction to the BCT, although cyber attack are often also a 
part of the threat’s repertoire.  
Detailed planning of a military operation requires an 
intensive effort of highly trained professionals, called the BCT 
planning staff. Typically, it consists of four or five officers, 
ranging in rank from captain to lieutenant colonel, who 
perform this work with the support of a subordinate staff. The 
process normally takes from two to eight hours – not unlike a 
typical cyber wargame. The physical environment often 
consists of a tent extended from the back of one or several 
Army trucks or armored command-and-control vehicles; 
folding tables and chairs, and -- similarly to a cyber wargame -
- either computer screens or paper maps on which the officers 
draw symbols of units and arrows of movements. 
The input for the staff’s effort comes usually from the unit 
commander as a high-level specification of the operation. 
With this input, the planning staff works as a team – called the 
Blue cell – perform actual wargaming, including: 
 Predicting enemy actions or reactions. This is done 
by the Red cell, usually the officer who specializes in 
collecting and analyzing enemy intelligence [13].  
The Red cell plays the role of the enemy in order to 
help the Blue cell understand possibly actions and 
responses of the enemy. Similarly to the cyber 
wargames, Red cell provides two cases of enemy 
actions: the most likely plan of enemy actions, and 
the most dangerous (to the BCT) plan of enemy 
actions. The latter might be the same as the former, 
but usually is different as it involves assumptions of 
greater capabilities on the part of the enemy. 
 Planning and scheduling the detailed tasks required 
to accomplish the specified COA [14], and to prevent 
or respond to the threat actions (like the Blue cell 
defenders would do in a cyber wargame), and 
allocating tasks to the diverse forces constituting the 
BCT (like elements of a corporate response to cyber 
attack). 
 Estimating success of failure of friendly and enemy 
actions, and battle losses [15].  This is similar to the 
function performed by the White cell in cyber 
wargaming. 
 The process of estimating enemy actions and friendly 
actions may repeat in several cycles until a 
convergence is achieved: the Red cell is unable to 
suggest any further improvements of the enemy 
actions, and the Blue cell is unable to suggest any 
further improvements of the friendly actions. This 
hints at reaching something akin to Nash equilibrium, 
in game theoretic terms. 
This wargaming usually produces a plan/schedule in a 
synchronization matrix format, a type of Gantt chart (see 
Figure 1). The chart’s columns represent time periods. The 
rows contain functional classes of actions, such as Maneuver 
(which in turn includes such subclasses as Main Effort and 
Security), Combat Service Support (for example, logistics), 
Military Intelligence, and so on. This plan-schedule’s content, 
recorded largely in the matrix cells, includes the tasks and 
actions of the friendly force’s subunits and assets, their 
objectives and manner of execution, expected timing, 
dependencies and synchronization, routes and locations, 
availability of supplies, combat losses, enemy situation and 
actions, and so on.  
Ultimately, the purpose of the military wargame is for the 
Blue cell to consider and select a small (manageable, often on 
the order of three) number of COAs that are seen as most 
advantageous to the Blue side.  In doing so, the Blue cell has 
to make an assumption about the COA that would be adopted 
by the Red side. In military wargaming, there are several ways 
to approach this difficult decision. 
One approach is to consider the “most likely” COA of the 
opponent, i.e., the Red COA that the Blue cell feels is most 
likely to be adopted by the Red side. This assessment of 
likelihood might be based on Blue cell’s knowledge of the 
Red side’s preferences, e.g., the COAs that the Red side has 
adopted in previous battles. Alternatively, the Blue cell might 
decide that the most likely Red COA is the one that provides 
the Red side with the greatest advantage or greatest utility in 
the battle. 
Another approach might be to consider the “most 
dangerous” or “most damaging” Red COA – the COA that 
would cause the greatest damage to the Blue side. Note that 
the “most likely” and “most damaging” Red COAs are often 
different.  
Having selected the “most likely” Red COA, and the 
“most damaging” Red COA, the Blue cell usually attempts to 
select a Blue COA that would perform sufficiently well 
against both of the Red COAs.  
Besides creating this tangible set of potential strategies, 
other valuable outcomes of this wargaming are similar to 
those of corporate cyber wargames: identification of hidden 
vulnerabilities, incorrect assumptions, risks and losses, 
education, clarity of roles and responsibilities.  It is important 
to note that the execution and modeling of a wargame is not 
necessarily representative of a real-world encounter.  Real-
world actors likely do not have complete knowledge of the 
strategies and limitations of their opponents and a systematic 
or mathematical formulation for computing optimal strategies 
may be difficult or impractical.  While complex models may 
be able to be constructed for real-world scenarios, it is outside 
the scope of this paper to do so; our simple model is mean to 
apply  only to cyber wargaming. 
In the remainder of the paper, we first propose a game-
theoretic model of a contest between cyber attacker and cyber 
defender. Then we describe an actual cyber wargame designed 
and led by one of this paper’s authors. We explore how our 
theoretical model may apply to the actual wargame. Finally, 
Figure 1: Fragment of a wargaming output in a synchronization-matrix 
format, adapted from [14].  The horizontal axis is time and the vertical 
axis describes specific wargame functions.  
we discuss the insights and benefits that the model brings to 
the cyber wargame, and offer a set of practical 
recommendations for designing and conducting cyber 
wargames.  
II. GAME-THEORETIC METHOD 
  In this section, we formulate an approach to analysis 
of a cyber wargame problem that combines elements of game 
theoretic and risk analytic treatments. We believe our 
approach is useful as a computational tool to aid in complex 
wargame and training exercises in which the strategy space is 
larger or more complex than is normally possible for most 
humans to explore.  In a later section of the paper, we then 
discuss an example of a real-world process where an 
approximation of this approach is used. 
A. Mathematical Model 
 In the following formulation, we are partly inspired by [16].  
Consider a cyber-physical system in Figure 2.  For this system, 
a cyber attacker desires to obtain a benefit  by accessing the 
system via the Internet and eventually obtaining control of the 
plant’s Programmable Logic Controller (PLCs).  In doing so, 
the attacker would have to penetrate defensive mechanisms and 
overcome actions of the defenders in several layers of the 
cyber-physical system.  
To make the discussion more general, in Figure 3, we 
illustrate an abstract notion of the problem: an attacker enters 
the outer attack surface with the intention of penetrating a 
series of layers guarded by the defender before arriving at the 
target.  Penetration of the layers will require specific malicious 
actions, and the overall path to the target determines the 
precise attacker “strategy” that the attacker intends to use.  
We describe the plans of the attacker with a set of  
potential strategies {  where  is the attack strategy 
space.  The attack strategies are identified by index .  
Likewise, the defender has developed a set of  strategies 
{  where  is the defense strategy space and  is 
the defense strategy index.  In this work we describe a 
simplified model in which both attacker and defender have 
complete knowledge of the system and can therefore 
determine each other’s strategies.  The defender strategies are 
accomplished by selecting specific subsets of cyber-defense 
mitigations {  where  is the set of all 
mitigations, and  is the mitigation index. 
As shown in Figure 3, there are  layers that the 
attacker needs to penetrate.  We identify these layers by the 
index . 
There are costs for both the attacker and the defender 
for each specific strategy tuple .  That is, given an attack 
strategy  and a defense strategy , the attacker suffers a cost 
 to accomplish his goal and the defender spends a cost 
 to deploy his defense strategy. 
Finally, given a strategy choice , the attacker is 
assumed to penetrate layer  with probability   , 
or  in shorthand notation.  As shown in Figure 3, if the 
attacker penetrates all  layers, he reaches the target  and 
obtains a benefit . 
In the model below, we consider the scenario of 
when the attacker gains benefit , the defender loses an 
equivalent value ( ) of his assets.  This constraint could easily 
be modified as the situation demands.   
The attacker and defender expected utility  
depends on the benefit , the total probability of penetrating 
all layers , and expended costs .  For 
the attacker:  
 
(1a) , 
or, in shorthand notation 
(1b)  
Likewise, for the defender: 
 
 
Figure 3: Abstract illustration of an attacker and defender penetrating 
and protecting Nl cyber layers surrounding a central target.  The attacker 
receives benefit b after penetrating the final layer. 
 
Figure 2: Sample Cyber-physical System (CPS) connected to the 
Internet.  Three Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) control fuel 
tanks and a dispensing authorization station. 
(2a)         
, or, in shorthand notation 
(2b)  
The challenge for each player is to select the strategy,  and 
, for attacker and defender respectively.  As will be 
described in section II.B, there are a number of methods the 
attacker and defender may use to select their strategies  and 
..  Upon selection of the player strategies  and , the 
total probability of penetration can be computed: 
(3)   
B. Strategy Selection 
Once the attacker and defender costs and penetration 
probabilities are known or assumed, payoff matrices  and 
 can be computed and inspected by each player to 
determine their preferred strategy.  In this section, we describe 
four methods by which the defenders and attackers in the 
wargame may choose their strategy.  We discuss these 
methods in more detail in section IV, in the context of the 
specific case study outlined in section III.   
Pure Strategy Equilibria 
We first describe the case in which the players 
choose a single unique strategy (pure strategy approach) as 
opposed to estimating a probabilistically weighted set of 
multiple strategies (a.k.a. mixed strategy approach). 
The model outlined in section II.A does not describe 
a zero-sum game (defined as ) and a Nash 
equilibrium state for  and  may not exist.  However, since 
the number of strategies considered will be low enough to be 
manageable by a human, manual methods can be used to 
search for a local saddle point or a Nash equilibrium. 
That is, if we search over each defense strategy j for 
the preferred attack strategies  of the attacker 
(4a)   
 
 
and, likewise, search over each attack strategy i for the 
preferred defense strategies  of the defender 
(4b)  , 
and find saddle points in the payoff matrices, one or more 
“most likely” equilibrium strategies may be found.  If only 
one equilibrium point is found, it is by definition a Nash 
equilibrium.  We illustrate this method further in sections III 
and IV. 
Equilibrium strategies such as these may be preferred 
by the players in the case when the payoff matrices are fully 
disclosed to both players and both players must choose their 
strategy simultaneously. 
Strong Stackelberg Strategy Equilibria 
A common method for finding solutions to non zero-
sum games is assume that one of the players has the 
opportunity to be first in selecting his strategy, and chooses a 
mixed strategy solution and the opponent follows with a pure 
strategy (i.e. a single strategy with 100% probability).  The 
equilibrium strategies in this scenario are known as Strong 
Stackelberg Equilibria (SSE) [17,18].  If the wargame is 
played in this manner, the leader and the follower could use 
one of the many methods for finding SSE solutions, such as 
those described in [19].  While we do not discuss SSE 
equilibria further in this work, we later consider an example 
where multiple strategies are considered to some extent. 
Playing Against the Most Likely Strategy of the Opponent 
As described in section I.B, a player may choose a 
strategy by first estimating the “most likely” strategy of the 
opponent, based on any available information about the 
opponent. Then the player selects his own strategy based on 
how successful it will be against the “most likely” strategy of 
the opponent. 
Playing Against the Most Damaging Strategy of the Opponent 
Alternatively, as described in section I.B, a player may 
choose a strategy by first estimating the “most damaging” 
strategy of the opponent, i.e., the strategy in which the 
opponent would impose the most severe losses on the player. 
Then the player selects his own strategy based on how 
successful it will be against the “most damaging” strategy of 
the opponent. 
C. Sample Calculation 
To illustrate, we provide sample calculations for a simple 
scenario.  Suppose a freelancing cyber-crime group is engaged 
by an anonymous third party to penetrate controls of a 
munitions plant. Two layers of the network need to be 
defeated:  and . If successful, the attacker will be 
paid a benefit  of $50k.  The defender of the plant 
consistently uses a single strategy . 
Based on the preliminary reconnaissance of the plant’s 
network, the attacker considers two possible strategies. The 
first strategy  will use an available exploit that will rapidly 
defeat the defenses of layer 1 with probability . 
However the exploit is noisy and will likely alert the 
defenders, thereby reducing the probability of penetrating 
layer 2 to  = 0.1. The cost associated with this “fast and 
noisy” strategy  is only  $5k. The second strategy 
 will require the development of a new, stealthy exploit for 
layer 1, and will take longer to deploy.  In this case, 
and the costs to the attacker are 
much higher  $15k.  
Using Equation (1), the expected attacker utilities for the 
first and second attacks are, respectively: 
 
  
. 
Clearly, the second attack has higher utility and therefore 
the attacker selects .  The attacker’s probability of 
success  0.9⋅0.8= 0.72 
D. Practical Considerations 
To generalize, the overall process for calculating the 
game-theoretic quantities in section II.A is: 
1. Collect information about 
, and 
 from empirical and experimental 
sources 
2. Compute cost-utility functions (payoff matrices) and 
total penetration probability matrix using Equations 
(1), (2), and (3) 
3. Utilize the payoff matrices to determine the best 
strategy (see section II.B) 
The most difficult step may be the first one.  Quantitative 
data, such as  and  in our illustrative 
example, come from subject matter experts and may be 
difficult to estimate.  Obtaining such information, particularly 
from subject matter expects, may be a difficult and expensive 
process that can yield subjective, inconsistent and/or 
unreliable results. 
E. Relation to Military Wargaming Practics 
As described in section I.B, the practice and process of 
military wargaming (COA analysis) is as follows. Having 
collected and considered the relevant information, the Blue 
cell officers propose a friendly defense strategy  where 
the superscript H indicates a strategy devised by a human in 
the military wargame.  The strategy  denotes a sequence of 
activities and associated resources, time periods and spatial 
locations. This strategy is recorded in the synchronization 
matrix (Figure 1). Then the Red cell who plays the role of the 
enemy proposes enemy strategy . Given  the Blue cell 
produces a modified strategy  and so on.  In each 
iteration, and for each activity, the planning team uses its 
experience and doctrinal guides to determine whether the 
activity will succeed, and how much losses each side will 
encounter as the result of the activity. These iterations 
continue until equilibrium is reached where the Red cell is 
unable to suggest any further improvements to their attack 
strategy, and the Blue cell is unable to suggest any further 
improvements to their defense strategy, or both cells are 
exhausted in an unsuccessful attempt to find such an 
equilibrium. Implicitly or explicitly, the losses are expected to 
be kept below some maximum allowable value.  In the human 
wargame activity, risk is often assessed qualitatively by the 
players by estimating the likelihood of accomplishing the 
military objective of the battle, e.g., capturing certain terrain 
or destroying the enemy’s forces. 
In a comparable cyber wargame, our game-theoretic model 
and strategy selection methods offer an analytical tool for the 
Blue and Red cell to decide on their initial strategies  and 
.  The payoff and penetration matrices can be used as tools 
for considering subsequent strategies as long as no targets in 
the layers have been compromised and the costs are not 
changed.  While we do not offer a mathematical framework 
for determining subsequent strategies in the wargame where 
targets in the layers have been compromised and costs need to 
be modified dynamically, such a framework could be 
constructed using the same methodology. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CYBER-WARGAMING 
A. General 
As a more elaborate example, we consider the application 
of our game-theoretical framework to a table-top wargaming 
activity conducted at the US Army Research Laboratory [20].  
In this event, a fictitious AQUA cyber-physical control system 
(specifically, an Industrial Control System [ICS]) was 
designed and presented to two teams of human cyber experts – 
a RED team (i.e., Red cell) and a BLUE team (i.e. Blue cell) -- 
representing the attacker and defender, respectively. 
B. AQUA Wargame Information Packet 
A technical information packet [21] describing the AQUA 
ICS was provided to both teams before the exercise began.  
Highlights from the information packet follow. 
Figure 4: Process map for the production line in the ficticious AQUA plant 
The AQUA ICS is a food processing plant that produces 
packaged meals.  The process map for our fictitious AQUA 
plant is shown in Figure 4.  The plant executes six 
manufacturing processes.  The meat and vegetables are 
cooked separately. Once they are cooked, the meals are 
prepared and packaged in a material suitable for high-pressure 
processing. Once the high-pressure process is completed, the 
meals are placed in boxes and stored in a warehouse. 
 
The plant network used by the AQUA is shown in Figure 
5. It consists of six programmable logic controllers (PLCs), 
several workstations, a closed circuit television (CCTV) 
system, and a wireless network for tablet computers. 
Technicians use the tablet computers to access the human 
machine interface (HMI) displays.  The plant network is not 
connected to the corporate network or the Internet.  All plant 
machinery is hard-wired to the input and output modules of 
the PLCs. The CCTV cameras are hard-wired to the digital 
video recorder (DVR).   
C. Cyber Wargame Method and Execution 
Before the wargame began, in addition to reviewing the 
information packet read-ahead document, both teams were 
allowed to ask the game facilitators specific technical 
questions.  Answers were shared with both teams. During the 
exercise, the RED and BLUE teams met separately to review 
all of the technical information and discuss strategies.  Each 
team documented their potential strategies.  After this, the 
teams converged to share their findings.  The RED team 
shared their attack strategies with the BLUE team.  
Mitigations, counter-attacks, and counter-mitigations were 
discussed.  Details about the RED team strategies and BLUE 
team mitigations can be found in [20].  The representation of 
those results in terms of our game-theoretic framework 
(section II.A) is described in the following subsections. 
D. Description of Game-theoretic Variables 
 
Attack and Defense Strategies 
 
The RED team submitted five attack strategies 
, which we list in Table 1. 
 
{i} Attack Strategy  
Description of Attack 
1 Layer-2 Attack 
First the RED team gains access by cracking 
the password of the wireless network. The 
authentication credentials of the wireless tablets 
are then spoofed to penetrate the rest of the 
plant network. Complete control of the PLC 
traffic is then gained. 
2 Subversion and Espionage 
The RED team coerces a plant employee to 
install a rogue wireless device or malware into 
the plant network. The RED team, via remote 
access to the wireless device or via malware, 
then misdirects commands to the PLCs. 
3 Rival Employer Attack 
Posing as a rival employer searching for new 
hires, the RED team acquires vital plant 
information by interviewing plant employees. 
When a job opening becomes available at the 
AQUA plant, an insider sponsored by the RED 
team takes the job and consequently performs 
malicious activity to gain access to the plant 
network and the PLCs. 
4 Jumping the Airgap 
The plant machine that writes the media for 
patching the plant equipment is attacked.  Once 
that machine is owned, malware with 
capabilities for disrupting, destroying and 
Command and Control (C2) is installed and 
executed strategically. 
5 Human Interface Device Attack 
A human interface device (HID), such as a 
USB mouse, is infected with malware.  It then 
launches additional malware into the plant 
network, ultimately disrupting or destroying the 
plant processes.  
Table 1: RED Team Attack Strategies. 
 
The BLUE team proposed 15 specific mitigations 
(see Table 2) for their defense against the proposed attack 
strategies.  Since it is not feasible to consider all possible 
( ) defender strategies that could be 
constructed from the 15 mitigations, four defense strategies 
  were identified by selecting specific 
mitigations.  These four strategies offer potentially good 
security with reasonably acceptable costs.  A fifth strategy 
“No Action” was also noted and is identified here as j=0 for 
reference.  Defender mitigation costs were estimated manually 
by the BLUE team and are also listed in the table.  Complete 
details about the attack and defense strategies can be found in 
[20] and [22].  
Defender Computations 
We next describe our game-theoretical computations.  
Since all strategies by both BLUE and RED teams were 
known by both teams in the exercise, costs and penetration 
probabilities of the RED team were estimated based on the 
BLUE team mitigations.  We therefore discuss the defender 
mitigations and computations first. 
Figure 5: Plant Network used to control the AQUA Production Line 
 
We first construct a translation matrix between 
mitigations and defense strategies, based on BLUE team input 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Defense Mitigations and Strategies 
Mitigation Defender Strategy 
 
 
{k
} Description 
Co
st 
 
 
[k$
] 
No 
Actio
n 
 
(j=0) 
Basic 
Securit
y 
 
(j=1) 
IDS+ 
 
 
(j=2) 
IDS 
Enhance
d 
 
(j=3) 
IDS+ 
and 
Physical 
Security 
(j=4) 
1 Upgrade WiFi Security 
1
0  X X X X 
2 
Install 
Hardware 
Firewalls 
1
5   X X X 
3 
Install 
Network 
Honeypots 
3
0     X 
4 Configure VLANs 4   X X X 
5 Install Clear Conduit 8    X  
6 
Safeguard 
Plant 
Documents 
1
0  X X X X 
7 Install IDS 40   X X X 
8 
Install Layer-2 
IDS Sensor 
Feed 
4
0     X 
9 Apply STIG Controls 
2
5  X X X X 
1
0 
Upgrade 
Training 
Methods 
1
5  X X X X 
1
1 
Monitor Ports 
on Devices 
3
0    X X 
1
2 
Disallow USB 
Media Installs 5  X X X X 
1
3 
Upgrade 
Scanning 
Station 
1
5   X X X 
1
4 
Lock BIOS on 
Devices 5   X X X 
1
5 
Upgrade 
Physical 
Security for 
PLCs 
2
0     X 
Defender Strategy 
Costs Cd,ij [k$] 
(independent of attack 
{i}) 
0 65 144 182 264 
Table 2: BLUE Team Defense Strategies and Mitigations.  
Estimated costs are shown for individual mitigations and for the 
five strategies associated with the mitigations. 
 
(5)
 
 
 
The vector defining defender costs by mitigation m, 
 is also constructed (see Table 2).  We use the translation 
matrix  to compute defender strategy costs as a function 
of defender j:   
 
  
 
where implies summation (matrix multiplication) 
over m.  Note that defender costs are independent of attacker 
strategies i in this table-top wargame example.  This is a 
generalized case of our game-theoretic framework described 
in section II.A. 
Although the defender costs are not dependent on the 
attacker strategies {i}, we construct the defender cost matrix 
over {ij}: 
 
  , 
 
and use it to compute the defender utility.  Here, we have 
assumed that the defender strives to keep the portion of the 
defender’s assets b that would have otherwise been forfeited 
to the attacker as a benefit.  The probability that those assets 
are not forfeited is .   
We can then compute the defender cost utility as: 
 
  
, 
 
where  is computed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Attacker Computations 
 Four attack layers (cf. Figure 3) were identified by 
the RED team.  We reference the attack layers with index {l} 
and list descriptions of the layers in Table 3. 
{l} Penetration Layer Description 
1 Penetration into Wireless Layer-2 Network 
2 Penetration of Router RTR-1 
3 Penetration of Switch SW-1 into Plant Network 
4 Access to PLC 
Table 3: Penetration Layers for Attack 
Attacker costs were estimated by the RED team for 
each attack strategy  Costs were estimated generally as a 
function of BLUE team mitigation.  This differs slightly from 
our mathematical framework which requires costs as a 
function of {ij}, so we must translate the RED team input 
appropriately. We separate the attacker costs according to 
whether the costs were dependent on defender strategies 
(mitigations) or not.  Fixed costs are independent of 
mitigations and are listed in Table 4.  Differential costs are 
dependent on mitigations and are listed in Table 5.  Many of 
the fixed costs are associated with preliminary research, 
reconnaissance, and bribes which occur before the attack 
begins, i.e., before penetration of layer 1. 
Fixed Attacker Costs and Success Probabilities 
Attack 
{i} 
Justification 
(for Costs and 
Probability of 
Success 
Estimations) 
Layer 
{l} 
Cost 
[hr 
or 
k$] 
Probability 
of success 
Mitigations 
of Interest 
1 Research for 
WiFi attack N/A 120 hr N/A N/A 
1 Time to 
brute-force 
carack WiFi 
password 
1 24 hr 1.0 1 
1 Time to 
brute-force 
crack RTR-1 
password 
2 48 hr 1.0 8 
1 Time to 
brute-force 
crack SW-1 
password 
3 48 hr 1.0 8 
1 Time to set 
up 
modification 
of PLC 
traffic 
4 4 hr 1.0 7,8,10 
2 Research, 
Bribe N/A $65k 1.0 N/A 
3 Research, 
Bribe N/A $320k 1.0 N/A 
4 Research, 
Set-up N/A $35k 0.5 N/A 
5 Research, 
Bribe N/A $40k 0.5 N/A 
Table 4: Fixed Attacker Costs.  These costs were independent of 
mitigation or defense strategy.  We assume labor costs of 1k$ per hour of 
RED team activity. 
For the purposes of computing our game-theoretic 
model, we construct attacker fixed cost  and penetration 
probability  matrices for attacker and defender strategies 
{i,j} using the fixed RED team input from Table 4: 
 
 and        
 
 
 
Differential Costs of Attacker 
Attack 
{i} 
Mitigation 
{m} 
Justification (for Costs and 
Probability of Success Estimation) 
Layer 
{l} 
Cost 
[hr] 
Probability 
of success 
1 1 Additional time needed 
for cracking WiFi 1 24 1.0 
 7 Higher probability of 
detection 4 0 0.9 
 8 Higher probability of 
detection 2 
0 0.5 
 8 Higher probability of 
detection 3 
0 0.5 
 8 Higher probability of 
detection 4 
0 0.5 
 10 Advanced research 
needed and higher 
probability of detection 
4 4 0.7 
2 2 Lower probability of 
successful subversion 4 0 0.2 
 3 Wastes labor and higher 
probability of detection 4 20 0.7 
 7 Higher probability of 
detection 4 0 0.8 
 8 Higher probability of 
detection 2 
0 0.5 
 8 Higher probability of 
detection 3 
0 0.5 
 8 Higher probability of 
detection 4 
0 0.5 
 10 Advanced research 
needed and higher 
probability of detection 
4 4 0.5 
 11 Higher probability of 
detection 3 
0 0.25 
3 3 Wastes labor and higher 
probability of detection 4 
20 0.7 
 7 Higher probability of 
detection 4 
0 0.9 
 10 Advanced research 
needed and higher 
probability of detection 
4 
4 0.7 
 12 Defeats the attack 3 0   0.0
 14 Lower probability of 
success 3 
0 0.5 
4 6 Lower probability of 
success 3 
0 0.5 
 10 Advanced research 
needed and higher 
probability of detection 
4 
4 0.5 
 13 Malware may be detected 3 0 0.9 
5 6 Lower probability of HID 
installation 3 
0 0.5 
Table 5: Differential Attacker Costs.  These costs are 
dependent on BLUE team mitigations.  We again assume 
labor costs of 1k$ per hour of RED team activity. 
 
Next, we utilize the RED team input from Table 5 to 
construct differential attacker cost and penetration 
probability matrices, one for each attack {i}.  Since the 
RED team cost definitions are dependent on BLUE team 
mitigations and penetration layer, we index these matrices 
over layer l and mitigation m.  While this information could be 
stored and computed using 3-dimensional matrices  
and , for the purposes of illustration, we use five separate 
2-dimensional matrices (one for each attack i) in the following 
discussion. 
For example, for attack 3, by examining Table 5, we 
can construct differential cost  and penetration 
probability matrices : 
 
, and 
 
 = 
 
 
 
Since our game-theoretical model references 
defender strategy j instead of mitigation m, we recompute the 
differential attacker cost over {l,j}:  , 
where  is the transpose of .  The result for 
attack i=3 is shown below. 
 
 =  
 
We next need to condense {l} and construct a single 
differential cost matrix for all attacks {i}.  By summing row 
vectors over {l}, we obtain  for attack 3, 
and perform similar calculations for the other four attacks.  
The differential cost matrix over {i,j} is then: 
 
 
 
We can now compute the total attacker cost matrix over 
{i,j}: 
 
. 
 
The differential penetration probabilities for the 
mitigations are also computed from information provided by 
the attacker (given in Table 5) by constructing the differential 
penetration probabilities  for each attack {i} and each 
mitigation {m}: 
 
=  
 
 . 
 
Each entry is computed by multiplying probabilities 
over layers {l} for each {i,m} combination.  For example, 
from Table 5, attack 2, mitigation 8 has penetration 
probabilities of 0.5 for each of layers 2, 3, and 5, so that 
0.125. 
Once  is constructed, we then use the translation 
matrix to calculate and redistribute the probabilities as a 
function of defender strategy j.  For example, for attack 
i=3 and defense j=2 includes mitigations 1, 6, 9, 10, and 12, 
which have probabilities of success of 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.7, and 
0.0, respectively.  These five values multiply to = 0.0.  
Continuing this process, we find the resulting differential 
probabilities of success for all layers {l}, as a function of 
attack and defense strategies {i,j} is: 
 
 . 
 
The total probability matrix can then be computed by taking 
the element-by-element product with the fixed probability 
matrix:   
 
 
 
The utility cost of the attacker  is computed from 
equation (1b).  For our table-top wargame, the benefit b was 
$100k, so that: 
 
 
 
 =  
 
. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
As described in section II, the objective of our game-theoretic 
model is to provide a useful analytical tool for the attacker and 
defender to select their strategies based on cost utilities 
(Equations 1 and 2) and penetration probability (Equation 3). 
 
Attacker Cost Utility [k$] 
 Defense Strategy {j} 
j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 
A
tt
ac
k 
St
ra
te
gy
 {i
} 
i=1 756 428 358 358 -193.25 
i=2 935 431 11 -49 -67.75 
i=3 680 -324 -324 -324 -344 
i=4 465 86 73.5 73.5 73.5 
i=5 460 210 210 210 210 
Table 7: Attacker Cost Utility  for attack and defense 
strategies {i,j}computed from RED team input from Table 4 and 
Table 5 
For convenience, we provide the attacker and 
defender cost utilities (payoff matrices) and total penetration 
probability matrix in Table 7, Table 6 and Table 8, 
respectively. 
As mentioned, in both our table-top wargame and our 
game-theoretic framework (section II), we assume that 
defender and attacker have full knowledge of all player 
strategies and costs, and are able to compute the utility and 
penetration probability matrices. 
 
Total Attack Penetration Probabilities 
 Defense Strategy {j} 
j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 
A
tt
ac
k 
St
ra
te
gy
 {i
} 
i=1 1 0.7 0.63 0.63 0.08 
i=2 1 0.5 0.08 0.02 0.001 
i=3 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
i=4 0.5 0.125 0.11 0.11 0.11 
i=5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Table 8: Attack Penetration Probabilities  for attack and 
defense strategies {i,j}computed from RED team input from 
Table 4 and Table 5 
 
Given all this information, how should players select the 
most advantageous strategies? Earlier in sections I.B and II.B, 
we discussed general approaches to such a selection. In the 
following sections, we consider how to apply those 
approaches in our example wargame. 
A.  Pure Strategy Equilibrium 
If both players select their strategies simultaneously 
and each act to maximize their own utility, an equilibrium 
strategy pair will exist if the conditions outlined in section II.B 
lead to a single unique strategy pair.  That is, there is a 
strategy pair  that is a preferred (“most likely”) 
strategy for both players. To translate this into a military 
analogy, a single unique strategy pair might mean that the 
defender prefers to defend at the same position where the 
attacker prefers to attack. In the shorthand notation of 
Equations (4a) and (4b),  and  are 
unique.  For our table-top exercise, the preferred strategies are 
shown in Table 9.  These values are found manually by 
identifying the maximum attacker cost utility across the 
columns in Table 7 and the maximum defender utility across 
Defender Cost Utility [k$] 
 Defense Strategy {j} 
j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 
A
tt
ac
k 
St
ra
te
gy
 {i
} i=1 0 235 226 188 
657.2
5 
i=2 0 435 776 798 734.75 
i=3 0 935 856 818 736 
i=4 500 810 743.5 705.5 623.5 
i=5 500 685 606 568 486 
Table 6: Defender Cost Utility  for attack and defense 
strategies {i,j}computed assuming the BLUE team retains the 
value b of their assets with probability . 
Preferred Cost Utility Strategies 
 Defense Strategy {j} 
j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 
A
tt
ac
k 
St
ra
te
gy
 {i
} 
i=1   A A D 
i=2 A A  D  
i=3  D    
i=4  D    
i=5  D   A 
Table 9: Preferred cost utility strategies (see Equations 4a 
and 4b) for the attacker (A) and the defender (D). 
the rows in Table 8.  Preferred defender strategies are marked 
with an “A” and preferred attacker strategies are marked with 
a “D.”  As one can see, there is no single {ij} pair such that 
both i and j are preferred strategies, thus there is no 
equilibrium solution. To rephrase, there is no such a case here 
that the defender and the attacker prefer the same combination 
of their respective strategies. 
 
However, consider a situation where players are uncertain 
about cost and benefit estimates – a likely situation in the 
domain of cybersecurity.  The players may decide instead to 
use the penetration probabilities alone as utility functions so 
that the attacker aims to maximize  and the defender aims 
to minimize the same value.  That is, they intend to choose the 
most or least probably success of acquiring the target 
regardless of the cost.  Their respective preferred strategies in 
this case are shown in Table 10.  Here the maximum across 
rows and columns is calculated in the same manner using the 
probability penetration matrix (Table 8).  Note that multiple 
maxima and minima are found since some cells have the same 
value across the rows or columns.  In this case, there is a 
single common preferred strategy pair {5,4} that will satisfy 
both players as an equilibrium point, so that if each player 
used this method to make a decision, no alternative strategy 
would give any players an advantage. To rephrase, in this case 
the attacker is satisfied that that the defender picks the strategy 
4, and the defender is satisfied that the attacker picks the 
strategy 5. 
B. Considering Multiple Strategies of the Opponent 
Although we are not exploring here a mixed-strategy 
approach, such as the Strong Stackelberg Strategy Equilibria 
mentioned earlier, we can consider multiple strategies in our 
example wargame. For the sake of concreteness, let’s adopt 
the perspective of the BLUE team, the defenders. Looking at 
Table 7, the BLUE team would notice that from the attacker’s 
perspective strategy i=5 is generally better than i=4. Indeed, 
with i=5, the attackers gains better utility for all defense 
strategies except j=0, and even in the case of j=0, the benefit 
of i=4 for the attacker is insignificant (460 vs 465). Thus, if 
the cost utility is the primary consideration for the attacker, 
the attacker would surely select i=5 over i=4. Similar 
considerations may apply when the BLUE team explores the 
attacker’s strategies i=1, 2 and 3. After consideration, the 
BLUE team might conclude that it needs to select a strategy 
that defends the best against both strategies i=1 and i=5.  
Then, looking at Table 6, the BLUE team may decide that the 
defense strategy j=4 offers the BLUE team a relatively safe 
defense (in terms of cost utility) against both i=1 and i=5.  
Thus, the BLUE team could select j=4 as its preferred strategy 
in this manner based on the cost-utility matrices.  To rephrase, 
here the defender decided that the most likely strategies of the 
attacker are the strategy 5 and the strategy 1, and then selected 
its own strategy 4 as it provides better outcomes whether the 
attacker chooses 5 or 1.  
C. Playing Against the Most Likely Strategy of the Opponent 
Suppose the BLUE team has additional information that 
the attacker tends to be risk-averse. In that case, the attacker is 
likely to prefer i=5 over i=1, because i=1 might cause the 
attacker heavy loss (-193.25 in case the defender selects j=4). 
With this, the BLUE team can conclude that the attacker has a 
single “most likely” strategy i=5. In that case, the BLUE team 
selects defense strategy j=1 (with its defender’s cost utility of 
685) as its best play against the attacker’s i=5. To rephrase, 
here the defender decided that the one most likely strategy of 
the attacker is the strategy 5, and then selected its own strategy 
4 as the most likely to bring the best outcome against the 
attacker’s strategy 5. 
D. Playing Against the Most Damaging Strategy of the 
Opponent 
 Alternatively, the BLUE team might consider on how to 
avoid heavy losses, rather than how to gain best cost utility. 
Looking at Table 6, the BLUE team would notice the attacker 
strategy i=1 brings the defender the least utility against 4 out of 
5 defense strategies. In other words, the attacker strategy i=1 is 
the “most damaging” to the defender. In this case, j=4 could be 
a strong strategy for the defender. However, considering that 
the “most likely” strategy of the attacker is i=5 (as we 
determined above), it is safer for the BLUE team to select j=1, 
which gives the BLUE team a relatively good cost utility of 
235 even if the attacker selects the “most damaging” i=1. To 
rephrase, here the defender decides to focus on two strategies 
of the attacker – the most likely strategy 5 and the most 
damaging strategy 1 – and then selects its own strategy 1 that 
offers acceptable losses regardless of whether the attacker 
chooses the attacker’s strategy 5 or 1.  
E. Consequential Moves 
In summary, our game-theoretic model computations 
outlined in section II.A offer a set of tools in the form of 
matrices that the wargame players may use for selecting their 
initial strategies.  While we do not describe consequential 
strategies in this work, the model could be adapted so that 
similar matrix calculations could be used to consider 
Preferred Penetration Utility Strategies 
 Defense Strategy {j} 
j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 
A
tt
ac
k 
St
ra
te
gy
 {i
} 
i=1 A A A A D 
i=2 A    D 
i=3 A D D D D 
i=4   D D D 
i=5  D D D D,A 
Table 10:  Preferred strategies for the attacker (A) and the 
defender (D) when the penetration probability matrix is used 
as a utility function instead of the cost utility matrices. 
consequential strategies.  Both teams would need to reassess 
new costs and penetration probabilities given their current 
position in the game.  An elaborate game-in-game theoretical 
framework for solving a complete path through the layers of 
defense is described in [23].  In implementing such a decision 
scheme in practice, one must incorporate the effects that 
increasingly accurate information of the attacker has on his 
consequential moves as he penetrates the layers. 
In the case that either the defender or the attacker selects 
his strategy first and the opponent follows, any of the SSE 
computational methods may be used to find a vector of 
weights for the leader initial strategy [19].  The follower can 
then use the payoff and penetration probability matrix to 
decide on his next strategy. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
While our methods may have limitations in real-world 
scenarios, the game-theoretic model we outlined in this paper 
is suitable for assisting wargaming teams.  We demonstrate an 
application of our model to a fairly realistic wargame for 
which opposing teams have complete knowledge of the 
system and each others’ strategies.. Specifically, we find that 
the use of the model benefits the participants of a cyber 
wargame in several ways: 
A. Elucidation of costs, benefits and assumptions 
The players – either within a single team or in joint 
discussions by both BLUE and RED teams – are motivated to 
explicitly define, quantify and document a number of critical 
elements of their decision making process. They discuss and 
document layers of the defense that the attacker must 
penetrate. They think about costs and benefits from the 
perspective of both teams. They are compelled to search for 
additional pertinent information about costs and timing of 
attacks and of defensive mitigations, as well as their 
probabilities of success. They uncover and clarify inconsistent 
assumptions. Ultimately, they either arrive to a well-reasoned 
consensus or to a clear understanding of where the opinions 
differ. All these considerations and conclusions are likely to 
be well-documented as a result of these steps in the 
wargaming process 
B. Enhancement of potential strategies 
Having distilled their assumptions and estimates into 
overall quantifications of utilities and probabilities (such as 
Table 7, Table 6, and Table 8), the BLUE and RED teams can 
examine the data for the purposes of identifies opportunities 
for strategy improvements. For example, the RED team might 
notice that attack strategy i=4 is clearly inferior to i=5, from 
the perspective of the attacker cost utility. Should the strategy 
i=4 be eliminated from the attacker’s repertoire?  Or, is this an 
indication of incomplete or inaccurate information somewhere 
in the process? Or, could the strategy i=4 be improved in a 
way that would make it competitive with i=5? These are 
questions that are not likely to be asked – or answered -- 
without such a quantitative analysis. 
C. Aticulated selection of strategies  
The players can use this analytical process to engage in 
rational assessment of alternatives, and arrive to a selection of 
an appropriate strategy in a well-reasoned manner. The 
reasons for preferring a certain strategy can be clearly stated, 
often in a quantitative manner, and underlying reasons can be 
readily explained. Without such an analytical tool, cyber 
wargamers often have difficulties making a rational, 
explainable strategy selection.  
D. Future Research 
While this line of research can be extended in a number of 
directions, one of them is particularly salient: relaxing the 
assumption that both the attacker and the defender have full 
knowledge of the systems and technologies available to both 
sides. Relaxation of this simplifying assumption raises 
numerous challenging research questions. For example, how 
to make appropriate assumptions about the opponent’s lack of 
knowledge? How does making such an assumption increases 
the risk that the selected strategy might fail if the assumption 
is wrong? How can such relaxation of assumptions be 
portrayed realistically in a human wargaming?  
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